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Ever since the emergence of insider trading [see Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), for a historical
review] backers and opponents have argued over pros and cons and consequently whether insider
trading should be regulated or not.1 Advocates of strict regulation highlight the negative effects of
insider trading on investor conﬁdence and the attendant negative effects on market participation.
They point to the potential harm that reduced participation in securities markets causes the overall
economy and contend that adverse selection risk leads to larger spreads (Bagehot, 1971) and lower
price efﬁciency (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). Opponents of regulation argue that insider trading helps
increase price efﬁciency because it moves prices in the direction the price would be if more infor-
mation were public. In this view, earnings gained by insiders are the legitimate compensation for
generating and revealing relevant new information about the ﬁrm. Following this argument, insiders'
proﬁts are the price society pays for obtaining the beneﬁcial effects of enhanced price efﬁciency. See
Bainbridge (2013) for a review of the arguments and recent studies.
From a scientiﬁc perspective, studies on insider trading legislation, its consequences for trader
behavior, and the aggregate effects on markets are complicated by a major obstacle. The prevailing
legal systems prohibit insider trading and thus preclude empirical analyses due to a lack of data [see
Meulbroek (1992) for a rare counterexample]. In particular, it is impossible to analyze otherwise
identical markets once under a regime with and once under a regime without insider trading leg-
islation. Furthermore, any such analysis would have to be insulated against the noise of general
market events. To avoid this caveat restricting classical empirical research, we study the effects of
insider trading legislation using data from laboratory asset markets.2
In a laboratory experimental setting, we are not only able to observe every aspect of traders'
behavior, we also control the market environment. Varying only variables of particular interest (i.e.,
the intensity of insider competition and whether or not there are rules against insider trading) we can
isolate the effects of insider legislation on trader behavior, proﬁts, and market efﬁciency in different
environments.3
We structure our analysis along three dimensions. First, we explore whether and how informed
traders adapt their trading behavior in response to insider trading legislation. There is evidence that
insiders exhibit abnormally high trading activity (Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Meulbroek, 1992). So far,
however, there is no evidence on how these ﬁndings differ between markets with and without insider
legislation. Imposing prosecution risk on insiders changes their economic environment, presumably
triggering a behavioral response. Economically speaking, prosecution and ﬁnes increase insiders' cost
of trading.4 This increase in expected marginal cost has at least two consequences. First, we expect
informed traders to refrain from conducting transactions for which the marginal beneﬁts are lower
than the increased marginal costs, causing an overall decrease in market liquidity. Second, we expect
informed traders to camouﬂage their presence by adapting their trading behavior in order to avoid
prosecution (Medrano and Vives, 2001; Schnitzlein, 2002; Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2004; Hornung,
Leopold-Wildburger, Mestel and Palan, 2015).
The second dimension we study is the effect of insider trading legislation on measures of market
quality like the informational efﬁciency of prices, bid–ask spreads, and volatility. The analysis of price
efﬁciency lies at the heart of the economic reasoning against any sort of insider trading legislation.1 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) deﬁnes illegal insider trading as trading in securities, in breach of a
ﬁduciary duty or other relationship of trust and conﬁdence, while in possession of material, non-public information about the
security. See http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm for further information.
2 Experimental asset market research has seen strong growth over the last three decades, including several papers pub-
lished in top ﬁnance journals. Examples include Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (2003), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), Bhojraj,
Bloomﬁeld and William (2009), and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli and Zame (2010). Noussair and Tucker (2013) and
Palan (2013) provide recent reviews of experimental research on asset markets.
3 For example, see Nöth and Weber (1996), Schnitzlein (1996), Schnitzlein (2002), Barner, Feri and Plott Charles (2005),
Bloomﬁeld, Maureen and Saar (2005), Kirchler (2009), and Stöckl and Kirchler (2014) for experimental studies focusing on
different aspects of markets populated by asymmetrically informed traders.
4 See Becker (1968) for a theoretical analysis of crime and punishment and Aitken, Cumming and Feng (2015) for related
empirical work.
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the asset's fundamental or intrinsic value, since insiders cannot fully exploit their informational
advantage. Consequently, less fundamental information is reﬂected in prices under insider legislation
(e.g., Kyle, 1985; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Leland, 1992; Bhat-
tacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bris, 2005; Beny, 2007; Durnev and Nain, 2007; Bhattacharya and Daouk,
2009; Cumming, Johan and Li, 2011; Huber, Angerer and Kirchler, 2011; Stöckl, 2014).
With regard to bid–ask spreads, the evidence on the likely effects of insider legislation is
mixed, with both greater and smaller spreads ﬁnding support in the literature (Cornell and Sirri,
1992; Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman, 1996; Cheng, Firth, Leung and Rui, 2006; Cumming,
Johan and Li, 2011). The predictions for the likely effects of insider legislation on volatility are
similarly mixed (Leland, 1992; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Du and Wei, 2004; Cumming, Johan
and Li, 2011).
Our third dimension of analysis concerns the effects of insider trading legislation on informed and
uninformed traders' proﬁts. Traders' proﬁts lie at the heart of the economic reasoning in favor of
legislating insider trading. The risk of falling prey to adverse selection and being exploited by
informed traders is argued to undermine investor conﬁdence in the fairness and integrity of securities
markets (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Heilmann, Läger and Oehler, 2000); Schredelseker, 2001; Jeng, Metrick
and Zeckhauser, 2003; Beny, 2005; Huber, Kirchler and Sutter, 2008; Hauser and Schredelseker, 2014).
The complex interaction between informed traders' behavioral adjustments and the resulting effects
on market quality make it difﬁcult to predict how insider trading legislation will affect traders' proﬁts.
On the one hand, the introduction of insider legislation may reduce trading by informed investors,
which would decrease their proﬁts and increase the proﬁts of the uninformed. On the other hand,
reduced trading by insiders may make uninformed traders less cautious, such that the proﬁt
opportunities of informed traders increase.
Our results conﬁrm a number of empirical and theoretical results but also provide novel insights.
Regarding our ﬁrst dimension of analysis, trader behavior, we ﬁnd that traders reduce order sub-
mission activity by 23.5%, and use lower order (24.0%) and transaction sizes (23.2%). These
reductions are mainly due to changes in the behavior of informed traders. Since the uninformed
traders do not make up for this shortfall, the aggregate effect is less liquid markets under insider
legislation.
Our second dimension of analysis concerns market-level quality measures. We ﬁnd that insider
trading legislation increases mispricing by 25.8%. We also ﬁnd that greater shares of informed traders
in a market are associated with greater informational efﬁciency. While mean bid–ask spreads are not
signiﬁcantly affected by the introduction of legislation, bid–ask spreads decrease with an increasing
proportion of informed traders in markets without legislation. We also address the open question of
whether insider trading legislation increases or decreases price volatility, but ﬁnd volatility to be
unaffected by legislation in our setting. We conduct (and report) multiple checks documenting the
robustness of these results.
Our third dimension of analysis reveals our most surprising ﬁnding. Our results show that
informed traders' earnings (before redistribution of insiders' illicit gains to uninformed traders) are
2.4% higher under insider trading legislation. We trace this ﬁnding to the impact of the deteriorating
market quality reported in the previous paragraph. Informed traders exploit the lower level of
informational price efﬁciency to reap higher gains in the presence of insider trading legislation. This
result lends support to studies like Bris (2005) and Aitken, Cumming and Feng (2015), who report
similar ﬁndings from empirical work.
While there are advantages and disadvantages to any methodology, we believe that the advan-
tages of the experimental approach outweigh the disadvantages in the present study. We are able to
investigate varied facets of the thorny issue of whether or not to regulate insider trading while ruling
out many confounds typically plaguing empirical investigations. Controlling for different market sizes
and keeping all other inﬂuencing factors constant or randomizing them, we vary our variables ofPlease cite this article as: Palan, S., Stöckl, T., When chasing the offender hurts the victim: The case
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ferent shares of informed and uninformed traders.2. The experiment
In each experimental session, twelve subjects form a cohort and interact in a sequence of ten
independent periods. Ten out of the twelve subjects are traders while two act as market observers.
Assignment to one of the two roles is randomly determined at the beginning of the session and is
held constant for all periods.
2.1. Traders
Traders interact in a continuous double auction with open order books, frequently referred to as a
limit order market. Online Appendix A contains the experimental instructions and screenshots of the
trading environment. Traders can submit any combination of limit orders and/or market orders. The
order book is emptied before the beginning of every market and provides information about prices
and quantities of outstanding orders, but does not allow market participants to identify the originator
of orders other than their own. The trading protocol and the experimental implementation guarantee
full anonymity in this sense. Unexecuted limit orders can be canceled, without cost, at any time, and
are executed according to price followed by time priority. Shorting stocks and borrowing money is
not possible.5 No interest is paid on Taler holdings (the experimental currency) and there are no
transaction costs. Each market lasts for 240 seconds.
Assets live for a single period and are bought back by the experimenter after market closing at the
buyback value (BBV), which is equal for all traders. There are no other cash ﬂows originating from
assets. BBV is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution over ½30;85 (with one decimal place) before
the beginning of each market. Successive draws are independent.6
Complementary to our main setting variation of different insider legislation regimes, outlined in
Section 2.3, we also study the effects of insider legislation on competition for information rents
among informed traders. Thereby we are able to draw a comprehensive picture of setting effects in
different market environments. Note that the size of a market, n, equals the sum of the numbers of
uninformed and informed traders.7 Given this relationship, it is obvious that the experimenter faces a
violation of the ceteris paribus condition when studying competition among informed traders.
Changing the number of informed traders while keeping the number of uninformed traders constant
implies a simultaneous change in market size. On the other hand, changing the number of informed
traders while keeping market size constant implies a simultaneous change in the number of unin-
formed traders. Under both conditions, a setting effect could be caused either by the variation in the
level of competition among informed traders or by the changes in the numbers of uninformed or total
traders. We control for the effects caused by the joint manipulation of two variables by resorting to
the following design: Markets are populated by n traders, where n is an integer in the range from 2 to
9 inclusive.85 Only 2.2% (0.1%) of all subjects held less than 10% of their initial endowment of shares (cash) at the end of a market and
could thus have been considered (potentially) constrained. Even if these numbers were additive, only about every ninth market
would have had even one possibly constrained subject according to this deﬁnition. We thus ﬁnd little evidence that the short
selling and borrowing constraints were binding in a material number of cases. We discuss the issue of trading constraints in
more detail in Section 4.
6 Under such conditions, classical theory predicts a situation of no trade. See Appendix A for a discussion of this issue.
7 We use the terminology of Bloomﬁeld, O'Hara, and Saar (2009) to distinguish between informed traders, who in our
setting are fully informed about BBV, and uninformed traders, who know only the possible BBV range and have no exogenous
trading motives. We do not implement liquidity traders, a design choice we discuss in Appendix A.
8 The typical size of experimental asset markets varies between 6 and 15 traders, with some including more than 300
(Palan, 2013). Plott and Sunder (1982), Smith (1982), and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984) highlight that efﬁcient out-
comes in limit order markets require only a few traders. Regarding our own results, Fig. A1 in Appendix A documents that small
markets signiﬁcantly more frequently fail to open (i.e., do not see any transactions). However, when analyzing only markets
Please cite this article as: Palan, S., Stöckl, T., When chasing the offender hurts the victim: The case
of insider legislation. Journal of Financial Markets (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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Fig. 1. Subject assignment. Graphical illustration of traders' and observers' assignment to markets and the calculation task.
Notes: Numbers in circles are trader IDs. Hollow circles indicate that the trader did not receive information on the bbv while
circles with gray shading mark informed traders. Bold numbers in boxes indicate observers watching that speciﬁc market.
Dotted circles are traders assigned to the calculation task.
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(informed traders), while the remaining traders know only the exante distribution of BBV (uninformed
traders).9 Uninformed traders' best estimate for BBV thus is BBV's unconditional expected value of 57.50
Taler. Our information structure constitutes a minor deviation from those strands of the literature
where informed traders receive noisy signals. There are several reasons for our design choice. First, it
reduces the inﬂuence of insiders creating their own estimate of BBV based on misinterpretations of the
noisy information or its generation process. Second, inducing uncertainty among insiders about the
exact BBV in the experiment does not change in any signiﬁcant way uninformed traders' incentives to
participate in the market. Uninformed traders face an informational disadvantage as long as the signal
contains more information than the unconditional BBV, since they know only the unconditional dis-
tribution of BBV. Third, the expected implication of noisy signals would be a reduction in effect size.10
The number and identity of uninformed and informed traders in a market varies with each period.
See Fig. 1 for an illustration of this mechanism. In Fig. 1, market 1 in period 1 consists of three
uninformed (hollow circles) and three informed traders (shaded circles), while market 1 in period 2 is
populated by six uninformed and three informed traders, etc. Similarly, any particular trader's role
may change between periods. In our example, trader subject 3 is informed in period 1, uninformed in
period 2, informed in period 3, etc. The change between roles allows traders to experience the
advantages and disadvantages of both situations. Trading as an informed trader thus also facilitates an
understanding of the adverse selection risk confronted by uninformed traders.
If possible, we conduct two concurrent but independent markets in one period to optimally utilize
our ten trader subjects. For instance, as depicted in Fig. 1, in period 1 we pair a market of six with a
market of four traders and conduct both in the same period to employ all ten trader subjects. There is(footnote continued)
that do open, robustness check 2 in Appendix B, Table B1, documents that there is no material difference in terms of mispricing,
spread, and standard deviation between markets with r3 and markets with 43 traders.
9 Implementing a charge for receiving information would mimic potential information costs as are present in markets
outside of the lab. We nonetheless set information costs to zero as the main aim of this paper is the analysis of insider trading
legislation effects. See Huber, Angerer and Kirchler (2011) on the effects of information costs in an asymmetric information
setting.
10 An anonymous referee points out that the use of precise information may bias our design towards ﬁnding an effect for
insider trading legislation. While we acknowledge this point in principle, note that modeling informed traders as fully informed
is a common feature of some of the most inﬂuential models of informed trading (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985;
Dow and Gorton, 1995). We decided in favor of providing informed traders with perfect information to obtain a clearer estimate
of any treatment effect over potentially losing control about subjects' beliefs.
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Table 1
Distribution of observations over market types.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 0 0 12 8 7 6 5 4 4 4
1 0 12 8 7 6 5 4 4 4
2 12 8 7 6 4 4 4 4
3 8 7 6 5 4 4 4
4 7 6 4 4 4 4
5 6 5 4 4 4
6 5 4 4 4
7 4 4 4
8 4 4
9 4
# uninformed traders
# 
in
fo
rm
ed
 tr
ad
er
s
Notes: The cells report the number of observations collected for the corresponding market type, for a total of 280 (per setting).
S. Palan, T. Stöckl / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎6no link between the two markets in this case except that traders may share varying levels of common
prior experience. Thus, we collect data from an average of 17.5 markets per session, even though each
session contains only ten periods and even though every individual trader subject participates in a
maximum of ten markets. If the total number of traders in markets does not sum to ten, as in period
2 of the example in Fig. 1, the remaining trader subjects are tasked with solving simple calculation
tasks to keep them occupied. These design features help to reduce the dependence of observations
within a session because subjects do not, in general, share the same prior experience, and because
subjects know that periods are independent.
Similar to markets outside the lab, subjects are informed neither about the size of the markets, nor
the proportions of informed and uninformed traders.11 This design feature increases the compar-
ability of our experimental setting to markets outside the lab but also constitutes a deviation from
some theoretical models. In these models, it is assumed that traders are informed about the under-
lying structure of the economy. Concealing information on the presence of informed traders under-
mines this assumption, causing models to break down. See Schnitzlein (2002) and Stöckl (2014) on
the effects of concealing information on the presence and number of informed traders. Yet as argued
before, this design allows us to separate competition from market size effects.
Table 1 gives an overview of the number of observations we collect for each market type, deﬁned
as a speciﬁc combination of the number of uninformed and the number of informed traders. We draw
the sequences and combinations of markets randomly prior to conducting the sessions to ensure the
predetermined number of observations per cell listed in Table 1. The range of possible market types is
public knowledge, but the probability of occurrence of any type in any particular session is not.
Each trader in a market is endowed with 60 assets and 4,800 Taler. Taler and asset holdings are
reset at the beginning of each market. The ratio of outstanding Taler to the value of outstanding
assets, commonly referred to as the cash-to-asset ratio, is in the range of 0.94 to 2.67. These cash-to-
asset ratios ensure that traders are able to make transactions at reasonable frequencies and prices but
they are also reasonably low to avoid biasing our results by cash endowment effects. See Kirchler,
Huber and Stöckl (2012) and Noussair and Tucker (2016) and the references therein on the effects of
cash endowments on mispricing.
Traders' payoffs are based on their wealth ðWp;T Þ determined at the end (time T) of each period p, with
asset holdings evaluated at BBV. Subjects can obtain some additional earnings from (1) answering two
questions after the end of every trading period, and from (2) solving simple calculation tasks in case that
they are not assigned to a market in one of the periods.
Wp;T ¼ #shares n BBVþTalerþadd: earnings: ð1Þ11 Subjects are informed of the market size and the number of informed traders in two training periods we run prior to the
start of the actual markets. Furthermore, they may be able to infer the number of market participants and the number of
informed traders indirectly from observing market activity.
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ﬁxed amount of 66,000 Taler, and converted using an exchange rate of 900 Taler¼€1. The 66,000
Taler equal the sum over 10 periods of the values of the initial endowments (Taler plus assets)
assuming the lowest BBV realization:
Payoff in € ¼
P10
p ¼ 1ðWp;T Þ66;000
900
: ð2Þ
Given this incentive scheme and the zero-sum nature of the design, an inactive trader's earnings per
period depend only on the realization of BBV and will take values between €0 if BBV¼30 and €3.67 if
BBV¼85. At the expected value of BBV (57.5), traders earn €1.83 on average. Active traders' earnings
may deviate from these values depending on their ability to generate trading proﬁts or losses.
2.2. Market observers
Market observers monitor the market and do not actively participate in trading.12 They receive €15
as base compensation for their participation in the experiment. Their task is to answer three
incentivized questions at the end of each period, only one of which is of relevance for this paper. This
question asks observers to mark those of the traders whom they believe to have been informed in the
period just ended. For each correct answer, that is, for each informed trader they mark as having been
informed, observers earn €1. They lose €2 for each uninformed trader they mark as having been
informed. There is no penalty for failing to mark an informed trader. Risk-, loss-, and ambiguity-
neutral observers thus should mark a trader as being informed if their subjective probability estimate
of the trader being informed is greater than two-thirds.13 Earnings (losses) from the questionnaire are
added (subtracted) from the base compensation.
Observers provide answers to the questions based on publicly observable data (order book, price
chart) and (costless) real-time aggregate information about each trader's activity in the market (see
the instructions in Online Appendix A for details). Traders are identiﬁed by a unique ID consisting of a
letter and a number (e.g., J8). IDs change from period to period and each ID is used only once in each
session. This ensures that observers can connect each trader's individual actions within a market, but
not between markets. In cases where we conduct two contemporaneous markets in a period, each
observer is assigned to one of the markets (see Fig. 1). When there is only one market, both observers
are assigned to it. Observers do not interact and do not receive information about each other's
decisions or performance, thus ruling out competition between observers.
In the experiment, we ﬁnd that the probability of informed traders being selected by observers is
slightly less than 1 in 4. We do not detect a signiﬁcant difference between the mean detection
probabilities in our two legal settings (see Section 2.3 for a detailed description. 23.7% in NOLEG, 24.3%
in LEG; ranging up to maxima of 62.5% and 53.1%, respectively). See Online Appendix B for details on
the parameter derivation of the observer question and further details on observer performance.
2.3. Legal settings
Setting NOLEG is the baseline setting, which is modeled to emulate markets with no insider
trading legislation. It is characterized by no connection between observers and traders. In other
words, observers’ decisions do not affect, and remain unknown to, traders. The LEG setting, on the12 We decided to rely on human subjects in the observer role for two reasons. One alternative speciﬁcation would be to rely
on detection algorithms, a procedure for example employed by the SEC (besides being tipped by other traders or people
involved). However, market authorities do not publish their detection algorithms, making it impossible to copy their exact
procedures. At the same time, the development of proprietary algorithms would introduce an element of arbitrariness to our
study. The second possibility would be to use ﬁxed detection probabilities. This would, however, have made it impossible to
investigate informed traders' behavioral responses to legislation (e.g., hiding strategies).
13 As noted before, we elicited observers’ answers to three questions at the end of each period. The relevant question for
the paper at hand, question 3, is nearly identical to a second question except for the payoff structure (see instructions in Online
Appendix A). For question 2, risk-, loss-, and ambiguity-averse observers should identify a trader as being informed if their
subjective probability estimate of the trader being informed is greater than 50%. See Online Appendix B for more details.
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observer assigned to the market (or a randomly chosen observer in case both observe the same
market) are targeted with sanctions. The ﬁnes these informed traders have to pay are used to com-
pensate uninformed traders who made losses by trading with informed traders. Observers thus face
the same task in both settings, yet their decisions affect traders in the LEG setting only.
The LEG setting comes close to the currently prevailing system in major capital markets, where a
central authority monitors markets and punishes illegal insider trading. Speciﬁcally, our legal system
is modeled after the SEC procedure referred to as the “contemporaneous trader rule” (15 U.S. Code §
78t–1). It states that investors who trade in the same instruments as an insider are usually entitled to
compensation.14 Insiders' trading proﬁts are redistributed to investors following a pro-rata scheme
based on the number of shares the investor bought (if the insider proﬁted by selling) or sold (if the
insider proﬁted by buying), relative to the total number of shares bought or sold by all claimants.
In our experiment, the rule is implemented as follows. Correctly identiﬁed informed traders lose
their trading proﬁts. These proﬁts are in turn redistributed to traders who engaged in unproﬁtable
trades with informed traders. Trading proﬁt in this context is deﬁned as the positive difference
between a trader's wealth at the end of a market and the wealth at the beginning of the market (in
both cases, BBV is used to evaluate the value of the shares). The entire proﬁt deducted from informed
traders in this way is distributed to those traders who were not marked as having been informed
(even if they had in fact been informed), or who were marked but were in fact uninformed. The
distribution is based on the number of shares bought or sold at a loss.15
In this environment, informed trader i's utility function in the LEG setting, assuming zero redis-
tributions from other informed traders, can be written as:
Ui ¼ 1pdetection
   U Wp;T
 þpdetection  U min Wp;0;Wp;T
  
: ð3Þ
Assuming risk-neutrality, this can be rewritten to the following objective function:
max E Wp;T pdetection max Wp;T Wp;0;0
   
: ð4Þ
The informed trader will thus, loosely speaking, strive to minimize E pdetection
 
and maximize E Wp;T
 
.
However, there is a trade-off between these two goals. Informed traders who try to aggressively
increase their wealth may be easier to spot for observers, thus increasing the detection probability. On
the contrary, traders who remain inconspicuous because they, e.g., limit their trading volume,
emulate trading strategies of uninformed traders, or make unproﬁtable trades, may reduce their
detection probability, but may at the same time curtail their potential proﬁt. The optimal strategy
depends non-trivially on the behavior of all other informed and uninformed traders in the market, on
the market observer, on the trader's own risk, loss and ambiguity preferences, and on interactions
between all of these factors.
2.4. Implementation of the experiment
We conducted 16 sessions each in the NOLEG and in the LEG settings, yielding a total of 560
markets. The number of repetitions for each combination of numbers of informed/uninformed traders
(i.e., each market type) varies as outlined in Table 1. The table applies equally to both settings. We
decided to allocate more observations to market types with fewer traders as these are usually more14 If it is “not economically practical or efﬁcient to identify investor claimants and provide themwith notice,” the disgorged
funds are paid to the U.S. Department of the Treasury instead (Flynn, 1992, p. 121).
15 In line with our approach, civil ﬁnes in the U.S. may amount to between one and three times the proﬁt gained or the loss
avoided. In addition to this, the SEC levies substantial ﬁnes, which are absent in our setting. We decided to limit the level of
redistribution to the trading proﬁt. Setting potential redistributions higher than the losses incurred could spur strategic
behavior by the uninformed traders in an attempt to gain from redistributions. Although unlikely, one could imagine traders
(informed as well as uninformed) deliberately engaging in unproﬁtable trades with suspected informed traders, hoping that
expected redistributions would more than outweigh the losses. Such strategic behavior is unlikely to motivate trades in
markets outside the lab, but might conceivably have biased our results. Furthermore, given the low ﬁnes, we expect our results
to be conservative relative to the full possible effect of market authorities' enforcement activities.
Please cite this article as: Palan, S., Stöckl, T., When chasing the offender hurts the victim: The case
of insider legislation. Journal of Financial Markets (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ﬁnmar.2016.07.002i
S. Palan, T. Stöckl / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 9prone to idiosyncratic variation, thus necessitating a greater sample size in order to derive robust
results.
Our experiments were conducted in September, October, and December 2013 at the University of
Innsbruck, with a total of 384 undergraduate and graduate students from different ﬁelds. Most
subjects had previously participated in other economic experiments but each participated only once
in this study. The software was programmed in z-Tree 3.3.12 by Fischbacher (2007) and subjects were
recruited using ORSEE by Greiner (2004).
At the beginning of each session, every subject received the same written instructions, providing
information on both the trader and observer roles. Subjects had 20 minutes to study these instruc-
tions. Afterwards, the trading mechanism and the most important screens were explained in detail,
followed by two trial periods to allow subjects to become familiar with the experimental procedures
and the payment schemes. Role assignment (trader or observer) was determined before the trial
periods started and each subject kept his or her role for the entire session. In the trial periods, all ten
traders interacted in the same market. In the ﬁrst trial market, ﬁve subjects were chosen to be
informed, while the remaining subjects remained uninformed. These assignments were reversed in
the second trial market, such that each subject was trained once as an informed trader and once as an
uninformed trader. Subjects were informed of their role in the experiment (trader or observer) only
after they had read the instructions for both, but before commencing the trial markets. The infor-
mation available to subjects in each role, and the incentives they faced, were thus common
knowledge.
The trading screen provides traders with real-time information on their asset and Taler holdings
and the current wealth (with assets evaluated at the latest transaction price). A separate box, shown
only to informed traders, informs them about BBV. Transaction prices over time are shown in a real-
time chart on the left-hand side of the screen. (See page 6 of the instructions in Online Appendix A for
a screenshot.) At the end of each period, each trader sees a table containing information about the
preceding periods, including the trader's ﬁnal cash and asset balances, earnings, information status
(informed/uninformed), as well as the realization of BBV.
In the implementation of the experiment, we took great care to label everything neutrally in order
to (1) minimize experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010), and (2) avoid a potential interplay with
subjects' moral values. Speciﬁcally, we used no terms like “insider,” “authority” or “illegal” in our
instructions or on screen. (See Online Appendix A for instructions and screenshots.) Each session
lasted approximately two hours. In the NOLEG setting, traders earned on average €21.01 (s.d. €6.11)Table 2
Dependent variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition Description
LOT ¼ LO=TSO Limit order turnover
ST ¼ VOL=TSO Share turnover
LO ¼ LO=#LO Average limit order size
TRA ¼ VOL=#TRA Average transaction size
AD ¼
PBBV  Absolute price deviation
SPREAD ¼ 1VOL
P#TRA
k ¼ 1
SPREADk VOLk
Pk
Average spread
STDEV ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
#TRA1
P#TRA
k ¼ 1 ðRETkRET Þ2
q
Standard deviation of log returns
SΔEARNiju ¼
P
ΔEARNiju Sum of deviations from av.
earnings
Notes: LO¼number of shares offered to trade in limit orders; TSO¼total shares outstanding, i.e., the number of shares held by
all traders in a market; VOL¼number of shares traded; #LO¼number of limit orders submitted to the market; #TRA¼total
number of transactions; P̄¼(volume-weighted) mean price; BBV¼buy-back value of the asset; k¼ index of transactions;
SPREADk¼bid–ask spread at time of transaction k; VOLk¼number of shares traded in transaction k; Pk¼price of transaction k;
RETk ¼ lnðPk=Pk1Þ; RET ¼market mean of log-returns;ΔEARN¼difference between actual and average earnings, calculated for
each (active) market participant; i|u¼ index signifying signifying variables which are calculated for informed/uninformed
traders separately.
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Table 3
Independent variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Description
LEG Setting dummy; 1 in setting LEG; 0 in NOLEG
MONOIN Monopoly dummy; 1 in markets populated by one informed trader; 0 otherwise
SHAREIN Relative share of informed traders in a market
SHARE2IN Quadratic term of SHAREIN
NUMTRADERS The number of traders in a market, i.e., market size
PERIOD Period index, ranging from 1 to 10; serves as control for a time trend
BBV The asset's buy-back value
DISTANCE Absolute difference between the unconditionally expected value of
BBV and its realization in the current market
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€3.99) and observers earned €16.91 (s.d. €10.47).3. Results
We split the presentation of the results from our laboratory experiment into three parts. In Section
3.1, we analyze informed and uninformed traders0 activities in the markets. In Section 3.2, we study
various aspects of market quality. In Section 3.3, we elaborate on traders0 earnings.
3.1. Trading behavior
We now turn to the ﬁrst dimension of our analysis, where we elaborate on the level of market
activity, on traders' behavior in the markets, and on how traders are inﬂuenced by insider legislation.
In general, we observe lively trading in both settings, with only 34 (16) of the 280 markets each in
NOLEG (LEG) lacking transactions. Still, traders are active even in these markets. The average
(unexecuted) limit order volume in non-opening markets is 268.03 (114.69) shares in NOLEG (LEG).
Table 2 contains the list of measures we consider, as well as details on how they are calculated. We
refrain from indicating the level of aggregation in the table for better readability but report it in the
respective analysis.
Submission activity in a market is measured by the number of limit orders submitted ð#LOÞ and by
limit order turnover (LOT). LOT normalizes the volume of shares offered to trade through limit orders
by the total number of shares outstanding (TSO) to yield comparable measures across markets of
different sizes. Aggregated over all sessions, there is no notable difference in the total number of limit
orders posted ð#LOÞ between NOLEG (7,611) and LEG (7,660). We do, however, ﬁnd considerable
differences in limit order volume in that a total of 95,931 shares are offered to trade in NOLEG while
only 73,405 are offered in LEG; a reduction of 23.5%.16 The reduction is mainly caused by informed
traders0 reduced submission activity (62,380 in NOLEG and 40,259 in LEG, or 35:5%), as uninformed
traders submit similar volumes in both settings (33,551 in NOLEG and 33,146 in LEG, or 1:2%). The
average volume of a single limit order is 24.0% lower in LEG (9.58) than in NOLEG (12.60).
Trading activity is proxied for by the number of completed transactions ð#TRAÞ and by share
turnover (ST). Similar to LOT, ST normalizes the number of shares traded by TSO to yield comparable
measures across different market sizes. Aggregated over all sessions, the volume of shares transacted16 Note that the reported effect sizes are a function of the experimental design. They are intended to provide the reader
with an indication of the relative magnitude of the effects in our study and may serve as a base of comparison for future work.
Nonetheless, the corresponding effect sizes in a market outside the lab may differ from those reported here, just as effect sizes
in one market may differ from those in another. See Section 4 for a discussion of this point.
Please cite this article as: Palan, S., Stöckl, T., When chasing the offender hurts the victim: The case
of insider legislation. Journal of Financial Markets (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ﬁnmar.2016.07.002i
Table 4
Market activity and average limit order and transaction size by trader type.
Regressor # LO LOT # TRA ST LOin TRAin LOun TRAun
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
α 2.526 1.184nnn 0.732 0.213nn 2.648 0.264 12.279nnn 2.476nnn
(2.559) (0.195) (6.261) (0.097) (1.905) (1.049) (2.259) (0.861)
LEG 0.155 0.271nn 0.117 0.062 2.691nnn 0.937nn 0.406 0.198
(1.813) (0.107) (4.586) (0.052) (0.951) (0.459) (0.504) (0.441)
MONOIN 0.150 0.003 5.382n 0.052 5.017nnn 2.317nnn 6.610 0.854
(1.296) (0.114) (2.683) (0.031) (1.756) (0.794) (5.471) (0.563)
LEGMONOIN 1.691 0.039 4.353 0.032 1.014 0.140 6.007 0.582
(1.493) (0.115) (4.235) (0.035) (1.949) (0.918) (5.633) (0.708)
SHAREIN 2.861nn 0.421nnn 2.283 0.043 11.437nnn 4.815nnn 5.991nnn 2.386nnn
(1.111) (0.104) (2.891) (0.034) (0.899) (0.457) (1.212) (0.466)
NUMTRADERS 4.342nnn 0.025nn 5.674nnn 0.015nnn 0.589nnn 0.525nnn 0.173 0.483nnn
(0.176) (0.010) (0.538) (0.003) (0.131) (0.065) (0.277) (0.070)
PERIOD 0.304nn 0.011 0.107 0.004 0.029 0.125nn 0.029 0.031
(0.116) (0.007) (0.318) (0.003) (0.117) (0.052) (0.143) (0.049)
DISTANCE 0.007 0.004 0.033 0.001 0.013 0.030 0.004 0.060nnn
(0.043) (0.003) (0.109) (0.001) (0.030) (0.018) (0.041) (0.017)
BBV 0.047n 0.004nnn 0.103n 0.001 0.016 0.012 0.049 0.011
(0.024) (0.001) (0.057) (0.001) (0.013) (0.011) (0.036) (0.011)
N 560 560 510 510 560 560 560 560
R2adj 0.61 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.28 0.23 0.04 0.13
p 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: n po0:1; nn po0:05; nnn po0:01; standard errors, clustered at the cohort level, are in parentheses.
S. Palan, T. Stöckl / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 11in LEG is 24.0% lower than in NOLEG, where a total of 21,659 shares are transacted. Thus, in each
market of NOLEG (LEG) an average of 171 (131) shares are offered to trade, resulting in an average of
39 (29) shares transacted. The average volume of a single transaction is 23.2% lower in LEG (5.02) than
in NOLEG (6.54).
To determine the inﬂuence of insider trading legislation, we use these measures as dependent
variables in regressions with standard errors clustered at the cohort level. We apply ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation throughout the paper unless otherwise noted. Table 3 provides a summary
of the abbreviations and deﬁnitions for the variables serving as our regressors. Apart from the dummy
variable LEG, which measures the effect of our setting, we use several controls. MONOIN is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one for markets populated by a monopolistically informed trader.
SHAREIN is the relative share of informed traders present. It proxies for competition intensity among
informed traders. SHARE2IN takes SHAREIN to the power of 2 to control for non-linear effects. NUM-
TRADERS measures market size (i.e., the number of traders in a market). PERIOD ranges from 1 to 10
and controls for time trends. This control is particularly important, since trading behavior may change
as traders switch between being informed and uninformed and increase their understanding of the
adverse selection risk.17 BBV controls for the inﬂuence of the BBV realization. Finally, DISTANCE is the
absolute difference between BBV and E½bbv. It controls for the extremity of the BBV realization.
Our regression results are reported in Table 4. Columns 2 and 3 present data on submission
activity (#LO and LOT), and Columns 4 and 5 on trading activity (#TRA and ST). We ﬁnd that insider
trading legislation has no signiﬁcant effect on the number of orders submitted to the market or the
number of trades executed. However, limit order turnover – that is, the volume of shares offered to
trade in limit orders – is signiﬁcantly reduced. The coefﬁcient value of LEG in the regression of ST, our17 In fact, many asset market experiments have shown that subjects often fail to converge to equilibrium play until they
have gained some experience. See Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore (2005) for a study investigating this topic.
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the LEG setting in terms of shares offered to trade.
This result contrasts with Leland (1992) who presents theoretical evidence suggesting that
liquidity in a market will be reduced when insider trading is permitted. Related results are docu-
mented by Cheng, Firth, Leung and Leung (2006), who examine the impact of directors' dealings on
ﬁrm liquidity, ﬁnding that depth falls on insider trading days as compared to non-insider trading
days. Cornell and Sirri (1992) analyze insider trades using court records, ﬁnding that the trades
improved liquidity.
To explicitly test the inﬂuence of traders' experience gained during the experiment on trading
activity, we compare, by setting, and using t-tests, realizations of our variables collected in periods
1–3 (early periods) with realizations collected in periods 8–10 (late periods). We ﬁnd two signiﬁcant
differences between early and late periods. First, ST is signiﬁcantly lower in late periods of setting LEG
(two-sided t-test, t(156)¼2.30, p¼0.0227). This effect, however, might be attributable to the setting
inﬂuence of LEG, since we do not observe a signiﬁcant decrease of ST in the NOLEG setting. This
argument is supported by our second signiﬁcant result, which is that informed traders' average
transaction size is signiﬁcantly lower in late periods of LEG compared to early periods (two-sided t-
test, t(164)¼2.85, p¼0.0049). All other tests reveal insigniﬁcant differences between early and late
periods.18
Next, we investigate the effect of insider trading legislation on the average sizes of limit orders
(LO) and transactions ðTRAÞ. To get a more detailed picture, we calculate these measures per market,
and separately for informed and uninformed traders. Across all markets, the average volume of a
single limit order is 14.22 (10.40) shares for informed (uninformed) traders in NOLEG and 10.10 (9.03)
in LEG, respectively. The average transaction size is 7.22 (5.86) for informed (uninformed) traders in
NOLEG and 5.26 (4.78) in LEG, respectively.
In Table 4, Columns 6 and 7 (informed traders) and Columns 8 and 9 (uninformed traders) contain
details on the regressions. The setting differences in LO and TRA are conﬁrmed as being signiﬁcantly
negative for informed traders. The average order size (transaction size) of informed traders is reduced
by 26% (24%) relative to the setting averages of NOLEG while the average order size (transaction size)
of uninformed traders is reduced by 23% (14%) relative to the setting averages of NOLEG. The coef-
ﬁcient values for uninformed traders are negative, yet insigniﬁcant. Thus, the reductions in average
order and transaction sizes attributable to the LEG setting are more pronounced for informed traders.
3.2. Measures of market quality
We next analyze how three measures of market quality – absolute price deviation (AD), bid–ask
spread (SPREAD), and the standard deviation of log returns (STDEV) – are inﬂuenced by insider trading
legislation. Table 2 provides deﬁnitions for these measures.
To quantify the degree of convergence between prices and BBV – the informational efﬁciency of
prices –we calculate AD, the absolute deviation of the (volume weighted) mean price ðPÞ from BBV in a
market. Note that AD is an inverse measure of price efﬁciency. Lower values of AD indicate smaller
deviations and consequently higher levels of price efﬁciency. The setup of the experiment requires
the calculation of a benchmark level of AD. We construct such a benchmark by simulating, for every
possible level of BBV (i.e., realizations between 30 and 85 Taler in steps of 0.1), the average absolute
deviation that would result if bids and asks were submitted randomly over the entire possible
interval. We refer to this as the “random trading benchmark” (RTB) and use it to distinguish price
efﬁciency levels driven by random trading activity from levels where prices reﬂect inside information.
Our second measure of market quality is SPREAD, calculated as the (volume weighted) average
bid–ask spread, expressed as a percentage of the corresponding transaction prices in a market. The
spread is determined as the difference between the prevailing best bid and best ask at the time of a
transaction and serves as a proxy for transaction costs.18 Results available upon request.
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Fig. 2. Market quality plots. We plot AD, SPREAD, and STDEV in settings NOLEG (red markers) and LEG (black markers) condi-
tional on the share of informed traders in the market (left panels) and conditional on time intervals (eight intervals of
30 seconds each, right panels). In the right panels, we plot ﬁgures separately for markets populated by a monopolistically
informed trader (NOLEG_1 and LEG_1) and markets populated by two or more informed traders (NOLEG_2þ and LEG_2þ). In
the left panels, the solid and dashed lines represent the best ﬁt models (out of linear, quadratic and exponential speciﬁcations)
for settings NOLEG and LEG, respectively. Top panels: Average values of absolute price deviation (AD), an inverse measure of
price efﬁciency. The random trading benchmark (RTB, bold, solid, black line) is an indicator for the expected level of AD
assuming orders submitted at random prices (top left panel).Middle panels: Average values of SPREAD, a measure of transaction
costs. Bottom panels: Average values of STDEV, a measure of volatility. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
S. Palan, T. Stöckl / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 13Our third measure of market quality is STDEV, calculated as the standard deviation of log returns. It
serves as a proxy for the volatility of transaction prices in a market.1919 The number of available observations equals 510 (AD), 492 (SPREAD), and 436 (STDEV). The differences in numbers are
due to data availability. SPREAD requires a bid and ask quote outstanding at the time of transaction while STDEV requires at
least two transactions for calculation.
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Table 5
Regression results for measures of market quality.
Regressor AD AD 2 SPREAD SPREAD 2 STDEV
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α 9.126nnn 10.330nnn 0.262nnn 0.303nnn 0.206nnn
(2.643) (2.707) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048)
LEG 1.981nn 1.873nn 0.026 0.042 0.020
(0.874) (0.871) (0.021) (0.031) (0.022)
MONOIN 0.437 1.598n 0.099nnn 0.080nn 0.018
(0.964) (0.894) (0.035) (0.033) (0.023)
LEGMONOIN 2.166 1.964 0.087n 0.051 0.027
(1.678) (1.713) (0.045) (0.043) (0.023)
SHARE 11.732nnn 29.622nnn 0.030 0.098nnn 0.005
(1.057) (3.733) (0.024) (0.034) (0.022)
NUMTRADERS 0.874nnn 0.713nnn 0.020nnn 0.020nnn 0.005n
(0.168) (0.160) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PERIOD 0.093 0.121 0.005nn 0.004nn 0.004nn
(0.112) (0.109) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DISTANCE 0.291nnn 0.302nnn 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.056) (0.054) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BBV 0.097nnn 0.095nnn 0.000 0.000 0.001nn
(0.032) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SHARE2IN 18.415
nnn
(3.239)
LEG SHAREIN 0.126nnn
(0.043)
N 508 508 477 477 436
R2adj 0.33 0.36 0.13 0.14 0.02
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.188
Notes: n po0:1; nn po0:05; nnn po0:01; standard errors, clustered at the cohort level, are in parentheses.
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informed traders in the market (Fig. 2, left panels) and conditional on time invervals (Fig. 2, right
panels). In the top left panel, we plot the average AD values separately for NOLEG (red crosses) and
LEG (black dots). The red, solid and black, dashed lines represent the best ﬁt models for each legal
setting based on three different model speciﬁcations (linear, quadratic, and exponential). The ﬁgure
reveals a strongly negative relationship between the share of informed traders and absolute price
deviation, conﬁrming results from earlier work (Huber, Angerer and Kirchler, 2011; Bossaerts, Fryd-
man and Ledyard, 2014; Stöckl, 2014). It is no surprise that the highest AD values occur in markets
without participation by informed traders. Nobody in these markets is informed about BBV, so trading
cannot lead to price discovery. These markets also constitute the only cases where we observe AD
values greater than the random trading benchmark. Visual inspection alone reveals a marked dif-
ference between NOLEG and LEG markets, with the latter exhibiting higher AD values.
Using the same mode of presentation, in the middle left panel of Fig. 2, we plot average SPREAD
values over the share of informed traders. For NOLEG, we observe a highly signiﬁcant negative trend
as SPREAD decreases with increasing competition among informed traders. For LEG, the coefﬁcient is(footnote continued)
Additionally, we excluded two observations (0.4%) occurring in NOLEG markets from the AD analyses due to very unusual,
erratic trading activity that made them clear outliers. These two observations are markets characterized by a single transaction
at a price of 200. Moreover, both transactions are triggered by the same subject in two consecutive periods. The effects of
including these in the regression are easy to anticipate. Due to the high AD values, the coefﬁcient value of LEG is reduced while
its standard error increases, causing the coefﬁcient to become insigniﬁcant. All other results remain qualitatively unchanged.
We also exclude 15 observations (3.0%) with SPREAD values exceeding 100% from the SPREAD analyses. The average value of
these outliers equals 3.22 with a maximum of 9.62. With these magnitudes these outliers cause a massive loss of goodness-of-
ﬁt. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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S. Palan, T. Stöckl / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 15insigniﬁcant. In the bottom left panel of Fig. 2, we plot average STDEV values over the share of
informed traders. We observe neither a signiﬁcant trend in STDEV conditional on competition among
informed traders nor a signiﬁcant difference between settings NOLEG and LEG.
In the right-hand panels of Fig. 2, we analyze the development of AD, SPREAD, and STDEV over
time. We divide each market into eight intervals of 30 seconds each and compute our measures for
each interval. In the presentation, we distinguish between settings (NOLEG: lines with red diamonds;
LEG: lines with black circles) and between markets populated by one (hollow markers) and markets
populated by two or more informed traders (full markers).20
For AD (top right panel), the procedure just outlined allows us to analyze the process of con-
vergence between prices and BBV. We ﬁnd that AD improves only slowly in markets populated by one
informed trader irrespective of the legal setting. In markets with two or more informed traders, those
without legislation converge more rapidly in the ﬁrst two intervals. After this time span, AD in the
two settings evolves almost in parallel (i.e., both settings exhibit the same speed of convergence).
Overall, our analysis suggests that price efﬁciency evolves gradually over time. This result contradicts
predictions in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), yet coincides with results in Bossaerts, Frydman
and Ledyard (2014) and Stöckl (2014) who ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of strategic information
revelation (i.e., that information is revealed slowly to the market). The less aggressive trading by
informed traders documented previously does not seem to cause slower convergence to BBV.
We observe that SPREAD (middle right panel) converges to a constant level within the ﬁrst minute
of a market irrespective of legislation or competition intensity. This observation coincides with
observations in Bloomﬁeld et al. (2005) and Bloomﬁeld, O'Hara, and Saar (2009). Finally, in markets
with more than two informed traders, STDEV is highest at the beginning, but decreases over the
course of the market and stabilizes towards the end. This coincides with observations in Bossaerts,
Frydman and Ledyard (2014). In markets populated by a monopolistically informed trader, STDEV
does not follow a clear pattern.
To provide quantitative evidence regarding the effects of insider legislation on price performance,
we use AD, SPREAD, and STDEV as dependent variables in our regression framework. Columns 2, 4, and
6 of Table 5 present the results for the baseline regressions of AD, SPREAD, and STDEV, respectively. In
Columns 3 and 5, we present slightly augmented models for AD and SPREAD. In model AD 2, we
include SHARE2IN to reﬂect our graphical ﬁnding of a non-linear relationship between AD and the share
of informed traders. In model SPREAD 2, we interact the setting dummy LEG with SHARE to account
for the different developments of SPREAD conditional on the share of informed traders present in both
settings.
The econometric estimation largely supports our visual observations. It documents that AD is
signiﬁcantly lower in the absence of insider trading legislation, implying higher informational efﬁ-
ciency of prices. Taking the average of AD in NOLEG (7.68) as the reference point for evaluating the
treatment effect, informational efﬁciency is 25.8% lower in LEG markets. This result thus supports
earlier work reporting a positive link between insider trading and price efﬁciency (Manne, 1966;
Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Leland, 1992; Meulbroek, 1992). The negative coefﬁcient for SHARE in
both AD regressions, and the positive coefﬁcient for SHARE2IN in regression AD 2 similarly conﬁrm the
observations from Fig. 2. They document that markets with greater shares of informed traders are
characterized by lower mispricing and that additional informed traders have a lower impact in
markets that already have high proportions of informed traders. Furthermore, the negative coefﬁcient
for NUMTRADERS can be interpreted as a positive effect of liquidity on informational efﬁciency. Finally,
the positive DISTANCE coefﬁcient conﬁrms that more extreme BBV values – unsurprisingly – lead to
larger mispricing (also see Bloomﬁeld, O'Hara, and Saar, 2009). More interestingly, BBV itself is found
to be positively related to mispricing, although with a much smaller coefﬁcient than DISTANCE.
Moving on to SPREAD, the results from our ﬁrst regression analysis reveal no signiﬁcant pure
setting effect. They do, however, show that markets with only one informed trader exhibit sig-
niﬁcantly higher spreads, yet this effect is counteracted by LEG. We interpret this observation as
evidence that monopolistic informed traders act more cautiously under the threat of punishment,20 We do not plot markets without informed trader participation in the right-hand panels.
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signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient for the share of informed traders, lending support to the visual
impression from Fig. 2 of a negative relation between spread and competition. However, this relation
is counteracted in LEG, as evidenced by the large and signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient of the interaction
term of the share of informed traders with LEG. The combined coefﬁcients of SHAREIN and the
interaction term do not differ signiﬁcantly from zero in a Wald test (F(1,31)¼1.16, p¼0.2892).
Related papers by Roşu (2013) (theoretical, no legislation) and Hornung, Leopold-Wildburger,
Mestel and Palan (2015) (experimental, legislation) report bid–ask spreads decreasing in the share of
informed traders. In more general studies, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Bacidore and
Soﬁanos (2002), and Cheng, Firth, Leung and Leung (2006) report informed trading to be associated
with greater spreads. However, the latter four studies differ in design from our framework. First,
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Bacidore and Soﬁanos (2002), and Cheng, Firth, Leung and
Leung (2006) employ market makers. Second, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) have non-strategic
informed traders, and Kyle (1985) has only a single insider (a case for which we also observe a
positive effect on spreads – see the coefﬁcient of MONOIN). In yet another analysis, Bacidore and
Soﬁanos (2002) investigate NYSE specialist trading and ﬁnd that non-U.S. stocks exhibit larger
spreads compared to U.S. stocks. They note that the differences are primarily due to higher infor-
mational asymmetry and increased adverse selection risk.
We conjecture that the presence of market makers plays an important role in these ﬁndings.
Market makers have to set wider spreads when facing greater adverse selection risk. The presence of
informed traders is a source of such risk. In markets without market makers, bid–ask spreads are
reduced whenever there is competition between informed traders.21 In our own setting the beneﬁcial
competition effect is mitigated by the introduction of insider trading legislation. While we cannot
prove or disprove this conjecture with our data, we think it constitutes an interesting topic for future
research.
Investigating our ﬁndings from the SPREAD regressions further, we observe a similar liquidity
effect as for AD (lower spreads in larger markets). We also obtain a positive PERIOD coefﬁcient, which
we interpret as evidence that uninformed traders learn to be more cautious over time.
The results from our regression analysis of STDEV reveal no signiﬁcant setting effect, but show that
STDEV decreases over the course of the experiment as traders gain experience. Nevertheless the
regression's explanatory power, expressed in the form of the adjusted R2, is relatively small. The
literature documents both positive (Leland, 1992) and negative (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Du
and Wei, 2004; Cumming et al., 2011) relationships between insider legislation and price volatility.
Our volatility results do not shed additional light on these equivocal ﬁndings.
We test the robustness of our results on four sub-samples of our data. First, we only consider
markets where SHAREIN is lower than 0.25. This test is motivated by the fact that in real markets the
number of informed traders compared to the size of the market is likely to be small. Second,
robustness check 2 focuses on markets populated by at least four traders. We exclude the smallest
markets as they are usually prone to higher idiosyncratic variation. Third, we test how experience
inﬂuences our result in robustness check 3. This robustness check is motivated by the fact that in
many asset market experiments subjects fail to converge to equilibrium play before they have gained
some experience (Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore, 2005). Fourth, we calculate AD, SPREAD, and
STDEV using data collected over the last 30 seconds of each market. This procedure allows us to assess
legislation effects after most convergence activity in the market has ended. All robustness checks
support the qualitative conclusions from our main analysis. The corresponding results are provided in
Appendix B.21 See Dolgopolov (2004) for a review of the adverse selection literature and for arguments for lower bid–ask spreads in
the presence of informed trading. Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015), using schedule 13D ﬁlings, similarly show that informed
traders trade strategically and standard measures of adverse selection actually decline when they are active. For evidence in
favor of higher spreads at exchanges using market makers, see the literature section of Huang and Stoll (1996).
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Table 6
Analysis of informed traders' earnings.
SΔEARN for Before After
informed redistribution redistribution
α 0.205 0.022
(0.195) (0.183)
LEG 0.125nn 0.002
(0.048) (0.044)
MONOIN 0.052 0.070
(0.086) (0.083)
LEGMONOIN 0.083 0.002
(0.130) (0.130)
SHAREIN 0.293n 0.268n
(0.165) (0.158)
NUMTRADERS 0.030nn 0.021
(0.014) (0.013)
PERIOD 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.006)
DISTANCE 0.018nnn 0.013nnn
(0.004) (0.004)
BBV 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
N 360 360
R2adj 0.06 0.02
p 0.00 0.00
Notes: n po0:1; nn po0:05; nnn po0:01; standard errors, clustered at the cohort level, are in parentheses. Markets with either
no informed traders (100) or only informed traders (100) are excluded from the analyses. For ﬁgures of uninformed traders,
multiply coefﬁcients by 1.
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We now analyze how informed and uninformed traders' earnings vary with the insider legislation
regime. Across all markets, informed traders' average earnings are €1.89 (€1.92) per market in setting
NOLEG (LEG). Uninformed traders' earnings amount to €1.93 (€1.75).22 These earnings consist of the
payoffs from the market and include redistributions (in LEG), but exclude earnings from the ques-
tionnaire and from the calculation task.
Note that the earnings are subject to substantial variation induced by BBV, which may mask any
setting effects. Because of this noise, we apply the following procedure to determine the effects of
insider trading legislation on traders' earnings. We ﬁrst calculate market € earnings for each trader.
We then proceed by calculating average trader earnings in a market and determining individual
traders' deviations from this average ðΔEARNÞ. Doing so, we control for direct effects of different BBV
levels. Finally, we compute the sum of ΔEARN for informed and uninformed traders per market.23 The
calculation procedure is performed twice, once considering € earnings before and once after redis-
tribution of identiﬁed informed traders' proﬁts. The computed values are used as dependent variables
in our regression framework and the results are presented in Table 6. We only list results from the
perspective of informed traders, since the values for uninformed traders are identical except for
having the opposite sign.
Our results show that the summed deviations from average earnings for informed traders before
redistribution are signiﬁcantly higher in LEG markets than in NOLEG. This indicates that – ignoring22 While it may at ﬁrst appear puzzling that informed traders do not earn more than uninformed traders in NOLEG, this is
partly driven by different realizations of BBV in markets dominated by informed and markets dominated by uninformed traders.
See Table 6 for regression results showing the effects of several variables from the treatment effect.
23 Note that, given that our markets are zero-sum and that endowments are equal across traders; inactive traders earn the
market average and do not bias the sum of ΔEARN.
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the coefﬁcient value of LEG to the average of the sum of informed traders' earnings in each NOLEG
market corresponds to an increase in earnings of 2.4%. By construction, uninformed traders' earnings
are thus signiﬁcantly lower (2.3%), putting them at a disadvantage after legislation (but before the
redistribution of the ﬁnes levied on informed traders). Note that the 2.4% increase in insider proﬁts
due to legislation matches with the empirical ﬁndings of Bris (2005). He analyzes the impact of
insider trading legislation using acquisition data from 52 countries over the period from January 1990
through December 1999. Bris’ ﬁndings show that insider trading proﬁts increase by between 2.2% and
4.4% (depending on the measurement speciﬁcation) following the introduction of regulation in his
sample. Leland (1992) arrives at a similar result. Liquidity traders in his model framework suffer
welfare losses under regulation.
The result can be rationalized by the lower informational price efﬁciency under legislation, which
creates greater proﬁt opportunities for informed traders. The differences in the time development of
AD between NOLEG and LEG (upper right panel of Fig. 2) allow us to separate two crucial elements.
First, the less aggressive trading observed in LEG reduces competition between informed traders,
leading to a lower speed of convergence in the ﬁrst minute of the market. This behavior partly avoids
the “rat race” of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992, 1994) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996). Second,
after the markets’ starting phase, the speed of convergence between prices and BBV is identical in both
settings, creating a permanently higher proﬁt potential in LEG. The existence of this potential raises
the question of why informed traders in LEG markets do not fully exploit this opportunity.
The informed traders' reluctance to realize proﬁts can be interpreted in light of the economic
model of crime (Becker, 1968). Applying the model to our market setting, we predict that, since
informed traders' costs in case of detection increase from NOLEG to LEG, informed traders will only be
willing to engage in the more proﬁtable transactions in LEG. To support this argument, we resort to
the infeff measure introduced by Bloomﬁeld, O'Hara, and Saar (2009). This measure focuses on how
the actions of individual traders contribute to value discovery. The more strongly positive (negative) a
trader's infeff measure, the more her trades contribute to (interfere with) value discovery.24
As expected, we ﬁnd informed traders to exhibit signiﬁcantly higher infeff values (0.36) than
uninformed traders (0.21) (two-sided t-test, t(2521)¼18.32, p¼0.0000). Testing for setting
effects, however, reveals only a marginal decline in informed traders' infeff, from a value of 0.38 in
NOLEG to 0.35 in LEG (two-sided t-test, t(1262)¼0.67, p¼0.5036).25 Thus, informed traders' con-
tribution to value discovery is not signiﬁcantly affected by the legislation regime. To interpret this
ﬁnding, remember our previous observations comparing NOLEG to LEG: In LEG (1) informed traders
have higher proﬁts (before redistribution), (2) informed traders trade less, and (3) informational
efﬁciency is lower. Taken together with the infeff results, this paints a picture where informed traders
succeed in leveraging the greater mispricing in LEG to obtain greater proﬁts (before redistribution) on
their fewer and smaller transactions in this setting.
Apart from our analysis and that of Bris (2005), this notion is supported also by the empirical
ﬁndings of Aitken, Cumming and Feng (2015). They show that a higher level of detail in exchange
trading rules as well as more surveillance signiﬁcantly reduce the number of insider cases, but
increase the proﬁt per case.
Once we account for the redistribution from informed to uninformed traders, however, we no
longer ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effect of legislation on the deviations from average earnings.24 Bloomﬁeld, O'Hara, and Saar (2009) allowed subjects to trade only single units. We adapt the computation of infeff to
multi-unit trading by weighting each transaction by trading volume. Speciﬁcally, we apply the following procedure to every
transaction: If BBV is higher than the transaction price, we assign þq to the purchasing and q to the selling trader, where q
stands for the number of shares transacted. If BBV is lower than the transaction price, we assign q to the purchasing and þq to
the selling trader. For each trader, we then sum these values over all transactions this trader was involved in. Dividing the
resulting number by the total volume of the trader's transactions yields an infeff measure in the range of ½1; þ1 for each
trader.
25 Uninformed traders' infeff increases from a value of 0.23 in NOLEG to -0.19 in LEG (two-sided t-test, t(1257)¼0.79,
p¼0.4287).
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Although we ﬁnd that uninformed traders are not worse off after redistribution, note that legislation
and enforcement outside of the lab entail signiﬁcant economic costs. Redistribution only takes place
in the presence of an authority, which necessarily operates at a cost, which in turn reduces total
welfare. Strictly limiting our conclusions to the monetary impact of insider legislation documented by
our ﬁndings would thus suggest that overall welfare is maximized by forgoing the implementation of
such legislation.4. Conclusion and discussion
We conduct experimental limit order markets to study the effects of insider trading legislation on
trading activity, measures of market quality, and trader proﬁts. Our use of laboratory market data lets
us overcome the lack of reliable empirical data caused by the currently prevailing legal systems. This
lack of data inhibits an exhaustive scientiﬁc evaluation based on empirical observations. We show
that insider legislation has signiﬁcant negative effects on multiple market dimensions: Under insider
legislation, (1) markets are less liquid, as evidenced by a reduction in order submission activity by
23.5% and lower order (24.0%) and transaction sizes (23.2%), mainly due to changes in the
behavior of informed traders, (2) mispricing increases by 25.8%, while bid–ask spreads and volatility
are unaffected, and (3) uninformed traders' earnings (before redistribution of insiders' illicit gains to
uninformed traders) are 2.3% lower due to deteriorating market quality. At the same time, a greater
share of informed traders in a market is associated with (4) greater informational efﬁciency, and with
(5) – in the absence of insider trading legislation – smaller bid–ask spreads.
Our results indicate that individual uninformed investors' concerns about their own payoffs are
not a sufﬁcient motivation for insider regulation. Still, the negative impact of insider trading reg-
ulation we document contrasts with the fact that most western capital markets employ such reg-
ulations. This discrepancy can be rationalized in several ways.
Fairness concerns among traders may change the relative performance of, and overall welfare
induced by, markets with and without insider regulations. It is well known that humans care about
fairness (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). While subjects in our environment only have a limited
investment universe, outside of the lab uninformed traders could turn to other markets, asset classes,
or countries for their investments. Thus, they may refrain from participating in a market lacking
insider trading regulation. Given a sufﬁciently large proportion of investors with such preferences, the
attendant loss in liquidity could outweigh the drawbacks from insider trading legislation diagnosed in
our study.
Another rationale for the existence of insider trading legislation is rooted in public choice theory
(Bainbridge, 2013). This theory states that a (governmental) agency will try to increase its scope of
operations and enhance its prestige in order to obtain more resources. Insider trading laws are highly
popular among voters, such that a vigorous enforcement program is an effective means of attracting
political support for larger budgets. However, if the costs of enforcement outweigh the beneﬁts (as in
our experiment), this results in welfare losses.
Note that our methodological approach is of course not without limitations. First, where empirical
studies are hobbled by noise and confounding inﬂuences, limiting their internal validity, laboratory
experiments partly remove context from the decision-making environment, which carries the risk of
compromising external validity. Nevertheless, many laboratory experiments have replicated theore-
tical predictions (e.g., Bossaerts and Plott, 2004; Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Roy, Zame, in press) and
ﬁndings from the ﬁeld (e.g., Kirchler and Huber, 2007; Kirchler, 2009; Dijk, Holmen, Kirchler, 2014;
Holmen, Kirchler and Kleinlercher, 2014; Kleinlercher, Huber and Kirchler, 2014). Second, the beha-
vior of student subjects may differ from the behavior of ﬁnancial professionals. While the two subject
pools are found to behave similarly in many studies (e.g. Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider, 2005;
Cipriani and Guarino, 2009 and the papers cited in Observation 2 of Palan, 2013), there are cases
where their behavior differs (e.g. Haigh and List, 2005; Alevy, Haigh and John, 2007). We take the
strength of our results as evidence regarding their generality, yet are forced to leave the task of
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insiders in particular may engage in short sales or margin buying to monetize their information. Their
choice to do so can be motivated by a lack of sufﬁcient funds or assets or may constitute an attempt to
leverage a transaction to increase proﬁts. Several studies investigating the inﬂuence of trading con-
straints on (market) results suggest a potential relationship, although the ﬁndings with regard to the
direction of this inﬂuence are mixed (e.g., King, Smith, Williams and Van Boening, 1993; Ackert,
Charupat, Church and Deaves, 2006; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Bloomﬁeld, O'Hara and Saar, 2009).
As an anonymous referee correctly pointed out, this is a promising ﬁeld for future research. For
follow-up research regarding this issue, we recommend using an asset market design with longer
trading horizons, however. The longer the trading horizon, the more likely subjects are to run into
constraints due to ﬁnite endowments. In our experiment, endowments are reset at the beginning of
each period, which we judge to be likely to reduce or dampen any potential effects. Fourth, we
counsel against assuming that the reported effect sizes translate to markets outside the lab or to
experimental markets of differing designs. Any statements regarding effect sizes must always be
conﬁned to the speciﬁc model under study.
Taken together, we believe that our ﬁndings provide new input into the debate regarding the
desirability of insider trading legislation. Despite possible limitations of our design—a problem no
empirical or even theoretical study is immune to—we believe that the results merit further investi-
gation and hope that they will spark new research into this highly relevant element of security
market design.Appendix A. Discussion of no-trade equilibrium
In our experiment, assets live for a single period and are bought back by the experimenter after
market closing at the buyback value (bbv), which is equal for all traders. There are no other cash ﬂows
originating from assets. If we were to assume that all subjects were risk neutral and equally well
informed, their willingness to pay and willingness to accept would both equal E½bbv. Consequently,
the only equilibrium in this situation would be one of no trade. Abandoning the assumption of
homogeneous information in favor of our actual information structure similarly leads to a prediction
of no trade. Uninformed traders would not be willing to trade due to adverse selection risk, while
informed traders would not trade with each other because each informed trader's willingness to pay
and willingness to accept both equal BBV. See Akerlof (1970), Kreps (1977), Milgrom and Stokey (1982),
Tirole (1982), Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991), and Biais and Hillion (1994) for contributions on the
topic. Abandoning the assumption of risk neutrality leads to a prediction of only very limited trade,
with assets ﬂowing strictly from more to less risk-averse subjects.
Despite the strength of these theoretical arguments, their predictions have not been conﬁrmed by
empirical or experimental ﬁnance. As, for example, Odean (1999), Barner, Feri and Plott Charles
(2005), Bloomﬁeld, O'Hara and Saar (2009), and Shachat and Wang (2014) point out, subjects in
practice have reliably been found to trade with each other despite the arguments just laid out.26
Given this evidence, we forgo the possibility of introducing artiﬁcial requirements to trade, which
might bias our results, in favor of relying on subjects' natural propensity to trade. In contrast to the
theoretical prediction, we observe lively trading in both settings, with only 34 (16) of the 280 markets
each in NOLEG (LEG) lacking transactions. Despite the fact that the number of non-opening markets is
small in both settings, it is signiﬁcantly higher in NOLEG (two-sided test of proportions, z¼2.67,
p¼0.0076). Although we observe no transactions in these markets, traders do submit orders. An
average of 268.03 (114.69) shares are offered to trade in NOLEG (LEG), ranging from a minimum of 25
(8) to a maximum of 1555 (308). The difference between the two settings is marginally signiﬁcant
(two-sided t-test, t(48)¼1.89, p¼0.0647). The number of shares offered to trade in no-trade markets26 This excess trading activity may be due to, for example, (1) traders believing that they can proﬁt from interpreting
market information better than others, (2) traders believing that they can proﬁt from market-making activities by earning
(half) the bid–ask spread on average, and (3) intrinsic trader preferences for trading (“utility from trading”).
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Fig. A1. Non-opening markets. Number of non-opening markets conditional on period (left panel) and conditional on market
size, i.e., the number of market participants (right panel), in settings NOLEG and LEG.
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to trade in NOLEG (LEG), respectively.27
To investigate this topic in more detail, we plot the number of non-opening markets conditional
on period (left panel) and market size (right panel) for each setting in Fig. A1. The left panel shows
that non-trading markets are approximately uniformly distributed over the course of the experiment
in both settings. Testing for time trends by running an OLS regression of the number of non-trading
markets on a period index reveals no signiﬁcant time trend. The right panel shows that non-trading
markets are predominantly small, as measured by the number of traders. A total of 28 (11) markets in
NOLEG (LEG) have a trader population of no more than three.
In additional analyses, we examine uninformed traders' liquidity-providing activity and their share
turnover over the course of the experiment. A signiﬁcant and substantial reduction in these activities
would hint at an increased awareness of the adverse selection risk due to the asymmetric information
structure in our experiment. We calculate LO and ST for uninformed traders only and run OLS
regressions on PERIOD for NOLEG and LEG separately (standard errors clustered by cohort). For NOLEG,
we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient value of PERIOD in LO (coefﬁcient¼0.002, p¼0.5371)
and an insigniﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient value of PERIOD in ST (coefﬁcient¼0.001, p¼0.8510). In
LEG, we also ﬁnd an insigniﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient value of PERIOD in LO (coefﬁcient¼0.002,
p¼0.8854) but the coefﬁcient value of PERIOD becomes signiﬁcantly negative for ST
(coefﬁcient¼0.011, p¼0.0153). This effect, however, might be attributable to the general setting
inﬂuence of LEG, since informed traders experience the same signiﬁcantly negative trend in ST
(coefﬁcient¼0.013, p¼0.0091). These results echo the results presented in the analyses at the end of
Section 3.1. We conclude that there is no evidence that uninformed traders' experience reduces their
awareness of adverse selection risk.Appendix B. Robustness checks for measures of market quality
We test the robustness of our results regarding AD, SPREAD, and STDEV on four sub-samples of our
data. The results are provided in Tables B1 and B2. Columns 2–6 of Table B1 contain robustness check
1 (RC1) results, which only considers the sub-sample of markets in which the share of informed
traders is below 25%. It is motivated by the fact that in real markets the number of informed traders
compared to the size of the market is likely to be small. Columns 7–11 of Table B1 report our ﬁndings
for robustness check 2 (RC2). It focuses on larger markets, reporting results for a regression run only
on markets with four or more traders. We exclude the smallest markets as they are usually prone to
higher idiosyncratic variation. Columns 2–6 of Table B2 contain robustness check 3 (RC3) results. Here27 NOLEG: two-sided t-test, t(278)¼2.03, p¼0.0428; LEG two-sided t-test, t(278)¼4.13, p¼0.0000.
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Table B1
Regression results for measures of market quality – robustness checks 1 and 2.
RC1: 0oSHAREINo0:25 RC2: NUMTRADERS43
Regressor AD AD 2 SPREAD SPREAD 2 STDEV AD AD 2 SPREAD SPREAD 2 STDEV
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
α 54.349n 85.272 1.191 1.165 0.200 8.719nnn 11.330nnn 0.314nnn 0.363nnn 0.204nnn
(30.268) (92.805) (0.713) (0.736) (0.441) (2.567) (2.642) (0.046) (0.057) (0.043)
LEG 7.083nn 7.026nn 0.016 0.036 0.009 2.050nn 2.016nn 0.033 0.037 0.011
(3.126) (3.168) (0.050) (0.193) (0.048) (0.783) (0.766) (0.022) (0.035) (0.020)
MONOIN 20.006nn 25.754 0.094 0.088 0.061 0.324 0.161 0.111nnn 0.085nnn 0.043
(8.526) (18.901) (0.209) (0.214) (0.130) (1.030) (0.966) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027)
LEGMONOIN 7.237nn 7.158nn 0.096 0.109 0.060 2.317 2.227 0.155nnn 0.107nnn 0.058nn
(3.309) (3.383) (0.067) (0.087) (0.060) (1.481) (1.470) (0.038) (0.038) (0.028)
SHARE 91.959 241.454 1.642 1.537 0.219 11.884nnn 35.108nnn 0.045 0.110nn 0.001
(55.123) (407.424) (1.551) (1.705) (0.964) (1.173) (4.061) (0.028) (0.041) (0.020)
NUMTRADERS 3.080n 4.424 0.064 0.064 0.004 0.652nnn 0.540nnn 0.028nnn 0.028nnn 0.006n
(1.719) (4.131) (0.039) (0.038) (0.025) (0.180) (0.163) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
PERIOD 0.362 0.351 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.023 0.034 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.251) (0.260) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.127) (0.117) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DISTANCE 0.316nnn 0.321nnn 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.252nnn 0.258nnn 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.111) (0.112) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.051) (0.050) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BBV 0.127 0.125 0.003n 0.003n 0.002n 0.082nnn 0.078nnn 0.000 0.001nn
(0.083) (0.082) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.028) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)
SHARE2IN 281.826 23.347
nnn
(739.683) (3.517)
LEGnSHAREIN 0.219 0.128nn
(0.812) (0.051)
N 75 75 74 74 74 411 411 390 390 378
R2adj 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.32 0.40 0.16 0.17 0.03
p 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075
Notes: n po0:1; nn po0:05; nnn po0:01; standard errors, clustered at the cohort level, are in parentheses.
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Table B2
Regression results for measures of market quality – robustness checks 3 and 4.
RC3: 8rPeriodZ10 RC4: Last time interval (30 seconds)
Regressor AD AD 2 SPREAD SPREAD 2 STDEV AD AD 2 SPREAD SPREAD 2 STDEV
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
α 1.498 8.371 0.127 0.180 0.111 5.817nn 7.893nnn 0.202nnn 0.233nnn 0.099nn
(5.932) (6.793) (0.210) (0.190) (0.102) (2.580) (2.610) (0.046) (0.046) (0.057)
LEG 3.198nn 3.074nn 0.058 0.033 0.011 3.037nnn 2.945nnn 0.037nn 0.015 0.044
(1.515) (1.470) (0.040) (0.065) (0.024) (0.927) (0.779) (0.021) (0.029) (0.031)
MONOIN 0.082 0.888 0.145nn 0.121 0.003 3.813nn 4.673nnn 0.082nn 0.066 0.161nn
(1.332) (1.227) (0.077) (0.072) (0.034) (1.654) (1.553) (0.042) (0.043) (0.066)
LEGMONOIN 4.085 3.495 0.162nn 0.116 0.011 3.870 3.785 0.060 0.030 0.190nn
(2.586) (2.352) (0.096) (0.090) (0.040) (2.311) (2.238) (0.048) (0.049) (0.073)
SHARE 15.788nnn 37.789nnn 0.053 0.150nn 0.025 12.940nnn 33.856nnn 0.028 0.082nn 0.005
(1.907) (5.755) (0.059) (0.082) (0.022) (1.226) (3.786) (0.026) (0.035) (0.034)
NUMTRADERS 0.830nn 0.527nn 0.025nnn 0.024nnn 0.001 0.657nnn 0.511nn 0.015nnn 0.015nnn 0.002
(0.334) (0.294) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.187) (0.192) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
PERIOD 1.124nn 0.533 0.015 0.015 0.001 0.052 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.570) (0.655) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.100) (0.097) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
DISTANCE 0.289nnn 0.308nnn 0.004nn 0.004nn 0.000 0.293nnn 0.297nnn 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.082) (0.080) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.058) (0.054) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BBV 0.061 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092nn 0.090nn 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.045) (0.043) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SHARE2IN 22.679
nnn 21.607nnn
(5.034) (3.276)
LEGnSHAREIN 0.174 0.100nn
(0.114) (0.047)
N 149 149 143 143 129 360 360 332 332 150
R2adj 0.36 0.41 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.36 0.42 0.12 0.14 0.10
p 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.011 0.833 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040
Notes: n po0:1; nn po0:05; nnn po0:01; standard errors, clustered at the cohort level, are in parentheses.
Please
cite
th
is
article
as:
Palan
,S.,Stöckl,T.,W
h
en
ch
asin
g
th
e
offen
d
er
h
u
rts
th
e
victim
:
Th
e
case
of
in
sid
er
legislation
.
Jou
rn
al
of
Fin
an
cial
M
arkets
(2016),
h
ttp
://d
x.d
oi.org/10.1016/j.
ﬁ
n
m
ar.2016.07.0
02i
S.Palan,T.Stöckl
/
Journal
of
Financial
M
arkets
∎
(∎∎∎∎)
∎∎∎
–∎∎∎
23
S. Palan, T. Stöckl / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎24we explicitly test how traders' experience inﬂuences the results by only considering markets run in
periods 8, 9, and 10. This robustness check is motivated by the fact that in many asset market
experiments subjects fail to converge to equilibrium play before they have gained some experience
(Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore, 2005). Columns 7–11 of Table B2 report our ﬁndings for
robustness check 4 (RC4). Here we calculate AD, SPREAD, and STDEV using data collected over the last
30 seconds of each market. This procedure allows us to assess setting effects after most convergence
activity in the market has ended. Results from these robustness checks support the qualitative con-
clusions from our main analyses.Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ﬁnmar.2016.07.002.References
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